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1. Introduction 
  
It is widely agreed that Cambridge Analytica’s data business practices were, to say 
the very least, dubious. In early 2018, their “dirty politics” (Milan and van der Velden 
2018, 1) made global headlines.1 Not only Cambridge Analytica Ltd. (CAL) and its British 
parent firm SCL2 Elections Ltd. (SCL) found themselves in the spotlight: the social net-
working corporation Facebook Inc. and a little-known company called Global Science 
Research Ltd. (GSR) were also under scrutiny for their involvement in the retrieval of 
personal data from up to 87 million Facebook users.  
 
1
 News outlets had reported on the company earlier already. For instance, the Guardian reported on 
CAL/SCL’s ties with Ted Cruz’s presidential campaign (Davies 2015) and for Das Magazin and Vice, 
Grassegger and Krogerus (2016; 2017) focused on the role of academic research for the company’s alleged 
voter manipulation. Especially their 2017 article attracted quite some attention, but it was also criticised 
for overstating and mystifying the effectiveness of strategies taken up by CAL (see e.g. Karpf 2017; Bald-
win-Philippi 2017). I will come back to this point below.  
2
 SCL stood originally for Strategic Communication Laboratories. 
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In May 2018, CAL and SCL (including multiple, affiliated companies, such as SCL Ana-
lytics Ltd. and SCL Commercial Ltd.) filed for bankruptcy in the United Kingdom (UK); 
soon afterwards, their US counterparts followed suit. They are being legally investigat-
ed in the UK and the US (BBC 2018; Reuters 2018). Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg had 
to testify before US Congress and to justify the corporation’s role in exposing users’ da-
ta in a hearing at the European Parliament. Also, GSR-cofounder and University of 
Cambridge (UoC) researcher/lecturer Aleksandr Kogan received critical attention.  
In 2013, Kogan had developed the quiz app “This Is Your Digital Life”, harvesting data 
from Facebook users who installed the app as well as from their friends. The latter was 
possible due to Facebook’s pre-2014 terms of service (Wong, Lewis and Davies 2018). 
Initially, the data were reportedly meant to be used in his research.3 Later on though, 
through GSR, Kogan passed the data on to SCL elections. GSR was co-directed by Kogan 
and his UoC colleague Joseph Chancellor. In late 2015, Chancellor left GSR to work as 
quantitative social psychologist and user experience design (UX) researcher for Face-
book (Lewis & Wong, 2018). In the same year, Facebook learned that CAL had received 
its user data from GSR (Constine 2018). Only in early 2018 however, Kogan, the ‘This is 
your digital life’ app and CAL/SCL were banned from the social network (Stahl 2018).  
In this commentary, I will discuss the controversy around CAL and other ac-
tors/companies with regards to two main points. First, the paper examines the societal 
implications of the scandal: it focuses on the nexus of big data, democratic elections 
and citizens’ perceived freedom of choice as voters. Second, I interrogate the role of 
GSR in facilitating CAL’s immoral data practices. More generally, I reflect on the role of 
big data-driven research and related news reporting for the promotion of CAL’s claims.4 
I argue that claims concerning the effectiveness of CAL’s strategies were reinforced by 
the narrative that the company drew on scientifically grounded, big data-driven meth-
ods and models. I suggest that the involvement of academics in retrieving data and 
CAL’s purportedly scientifically substantiated approach lent credibility to the effective-
ness of its services. This also fed into persistent uncertainty regarding the case’s impli-
cations for individuals’ perceived freedom of choice as voters.   
The scandal around CAL, SCL, Facebook and GSR is particularly relevant, not only be-
cause of the public attention it attracted: on the one hand, it is a notable case, since it 
 
3
 In a public statement, the University of Cambridge explained: “In 2015, Dr Kogan applied to the Universi-
ty for ethical approval to use data collected on behalf of GSR for his academic research. His application 
was reviewed and subsequently rejected” (University of Cambridge 2018). 
4
 While I consider Facebook’s involvement just as problematic as the role of CAL/SCL and GSR, this com-
mentary will pay comparatively less attention to the social network. This should however not be seen as 
reflecting e.g. the responsibility assigned to each of these actors: instead, it is meant to ensure a clear fo-
cus of this relatively short paper.   
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speaks to the relevance of big data for politics and political campaigning (see e.g. Gon-
zalez 2017; Hersh 2015; Tufekci 2014). On the other hand, it concerns the politics of big 
data (see e.g. Noble 2018; Sætnan, Schneider and Green 2018; Coté, Gerbaudo and 
Pybus 2016) 
First, the case emphasises the relevance of big data for contemporary politics, be-
cause of the influential narrative that data and analytics were crucial to effective politi-
cal campaigning and electoral success. The controversy around CAL circles substantially 
around the issue if and how the company was able to influence individuals’ voting be-
haviour. Second, the scandal highlights the politics of big data by once more illustrating 
a crucial, though still all too often downplayed and strategically neglected point: data 
are never neutral – no matter on what scale and how (allegedly) ‘unobtrusively’ they 
are retrieved (van Dijck 2014; Gitelman 2013). Data are normative and influential in 
that they are societally embedded and may be e.g. used to give credibility to claims 
and arguments, to advocate or undermine certain causes.  
This commentary explores these two sides of the same coin and how they are inter-
connected. I start by examining how the CAL case was discussed with regards to its rel-
evance for contemporary politics. Subsequently, I show that the predominant, more 
general idea of big data’s alleged superiority, notably in combination with their scien-
tific use, played a significant role too.  
 
 
2. A wake-up call? 
 
What was and is at stake in debates concerning CAL, SCL and related ac-
tors/corporate entities is not ‘only’ the privacy of these users: the scandal also raises 
questions regarding individuals’ autonomy and freedom of choice as voters. The data 
analytics firm is not merely controversial, because of how it retrieved the data – de-
spite their approaches being highly problematic as such. Its data practices led to public 
outcry, because of what the company claimed and was said to achieve: the nudging 
and manipulation of individuals, with the help of (social media) microtargeting. By sup-
posedly profiling users based on, for example, their Facebook ‘Likes’ or preferences 
and then placing targeted, political advertising, the company is reputed to have swayed 
opinions and voting behaviour. This applies, for example, to the 2016 UK referendum 
on the country’s European Union (EU) membership and to Donald Trump’s 2016 US 
presidential campaign (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018; Rosenberg, Confessore 
and Cadwalladr 2018; Reuters Technology News 2018).  
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The news reporting and public debates interrogated if and how CAL might have af-
fected previous elections (see also Gonzalez, 2017). Moreover, it was discussed how 
the revelations were relevant to upcoming polls. In early 2018, speaking at a symposi-
um in Vienna, Věra Jourová, EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender 
Equality, described the CAL scandal as a “wake-up call” that “[…] raises serious con-
cerns about our collective freedom as voters and politicians.” (2018) She furthermore 
argued: 
 
[W]e have to understand if these practices might have had relevance for elections or 
referenda in Europe. If only one country’s elections are at risk of being manipulated, 
this has an impact on our whole Union. And this is a big concern, in particular ahead 
of the upcoming [May 2019, added by the author] European Parliament elections. 
(Jourová 2018) 
As also indicated in this quote, while CAL’s data retrieval practices have been widely 
condemned as immoral and potentially illegal, it is still contested and under examina-
tion to what extent their attempts were indeed effective. This uncertainty does not on-
ly alarm politicians such as Jourová; it also adds to concerns and insecurity among po-
tential voters. Wetherell (2018) gets to the heart of the issue when observing that: 
“The recent revelations about Cambridge Analytica have prompted a new and strange 
kind of anxiety: What if your political opinions are not actually yours?” (Wetherell 
2018).  
One may argue that this question is not necessarily new: it goes, at least, as far back 
as ancient Greek deliberations on rhetoric, i.e. persuasion (Jones and Simons, 2011, 
chapter 1). Plato criticised rhetoric as inevitably being devoid of any educational value, 
merely deceiving the audience. In contrast, Aristotle defended rhetoric as double-
edged sword, also vital to the imparting of knowledge and truth. Echoing the latter 
sentiment, though centuries later, propaganda was described as a tool “[…] to be used 
either for good, bad, or amoral goals – similar to advertising or public relations. The 
primary goal is mass persuasion […].” (Seidman 2008, 7) Long before recent efforts in 
using big data-driven techniques for political campaigning, technology has been a cru-
cial factor for the changing face of persuasion and propaganda. Advances in printing 
processes (e.g. the use of steel printing plates) allowed for the inclusion of images, 
such as engravings of candidates; the popularisation of photography enabled the use of 
photographic images in the 1920s and digital production conditions eased their manip-
ulation in the 1990s (Seidman 2008, 9−12).  
As Wetherell (2018) suggests: “Theorists from various different disciplines have long 
known that people’s desires and preferences are shaped by massive forces beyond 
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their control.” However, now it is not merely rhetoric that individuals may fear, but al-
ready the very selection of digital content that they may or may not encounter. This 
concern is closely related to recent developments in political campaigning and at-
tempts at increasingly data-driven (micro)targeting strategies to address and mobilise 
voters (Hersh 2015).  
A main anxiety that is instilled in voters and politicians alike is that even efforts 
aimed at deconstructing political messages could be largely futile: because such mes-
sages are tailored to e.g. their fears or interests; and because voters’ very chances for 
encountering certain kinds of content may be tilted. Wetherell (2018) suggests that, 
while triggered by the CAL scandal, this anxiety is rooted in an “[…] individualized way 
of thinking about voting that emerged in the nineteenth century”. This commentary 
will be less concerned with the historical roots of the issue though. Instead, it interro-
gates why the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of CAL’s data practices is prob-
lematic. More specifically, I focus on the case’s significance for democratic elections.   
CAL staff and affiliates portrayed themselves as powerful influencers and victims 
alike – depending on which strategy they saw fit for the respective audience. Shortly 
after Donald Trump won the US presidential election in November 2016, the company 
released a (self-)congratulatory press release. It included a quote by CAL CEO Alexan-
der Nix, stating: “We are thrilled that our revolutionary approach to data-driven com-
munications played such an integral part in President-elect Donald Trump’s extraordi-
nary win […]. It demonstrates the huge impact that the right blend of cutting-edge data 
science, new technologies, and sophisticated communication strategies can have.” 
(Cambridge Analytica 2016) In a pitch to an undercover Channel 4 News reporter, dis-
guised as potential client, company representatives boasted about CAL’s manipulative, 
political campaigning strategies and their impact on elections globally (Politico 2018; 
see also Channel 4 News 2018; Cadwalladr 2018). The video report, including record-
ings from meetings with CAL staff, first aired in March 2018. However, since such 
claims are simply part of the company’s marketing sales efforts, they do not say much 
about their actual effectiveness. The article title “Shadowy puppet masters or snake oil 
salesmen?” (Sutton 2018) pointedly summarises the discussion that unfolded after-
wards.  
The uncertainty whether or not CAL’s data practices were as effective as i.a. the 
company originally claimed was not least rooted in a longstanding discourse of ‘big da-
ta’ as the “holy grail of behavioral knowledge” (van Dijck 2014, 199). ‘Big data’ is a 
broad and hyped umbrella term for digital data retrieved from various sources on a 
large scale. The term is commonly associated with the ‘three Vs’: standing for (high) 
volume, variety and velocity – as main characteristics. According to van Dijck (2014) the 
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big data phenomenon has facilitated the ideology of dataism “[…] as a belief in a new 
gold standard of knowledge about human behaviour” (p. 198). This applies also to sci-
entific research: such research may draw on data which are e.g. retrieved from social 
networking sites (SNS). In doing so, it also validates big data practices – thanks to public 
trust in science (202ff.; see also Richterich 2018). Unfortunately, as Van Dijck argues, 
i.a. “[i]nformation scientists often uncritically adopt the assumptions and ideological 
viewpoints put forward by SNSs and data firms” (2014, 201). This may lead to problem-
atic entanglements between scientific and corporate practices – as also illustrated in 
the case of the CAL scandal.  
Due to the spreading ideology of dataism and increasingly complex interrelations be-
tween scientific and tech-commercial objectives, big data-driven practices are highly 
persuasive. This is also the case where their actual effectiveness may not be ex-
plained/justified in detail and hence questionable. Terms such as ‘big data’ and ‘data 
analytics’ have become potent buzzwords, relying heavily on dataism and an often un-
questioned trust in the power of (big) data. Such dataism also plays into the hands of 
actors such as CAL, since it gives credibility to their marketing efforts and service sales 
pitches.  
Nevertheless, a few months after the Channel 4 News video was published, during 
an EP hearing in June 2018, Alexander Nix described himself as “victimised”, blaming in 
particular liberal media and former employee/‘whistleblower’ Christopher Wylie for 
the company’s downfall. It should be noted here that many of his comments were di-
rectly refuted during the hearing, e.g. by “[…] Brendan O’Hara, a member of the Scot-
tish National Party, [who] told Nix during the hearing. ‘By no stretch of the imagination 
can you be seen as the victim’.” (Lapowsky 2018) CAL obstructed insights into its busi-
ness practices, e.g. by deleting previously held Facebook data and then denying having 
ever received these data (Waterson 2018). Since the unfolding of the scandal, company 
representatives have been ambiguous and obscure about their big data-driven practic-
es and their effectiveness – in stark contrast to earlier claims targeted at potential cli-
ents.  
This obstruction of insight into the case may have ultimately contributed to CAL’s 
downfall. However, their ambiguity also feeds into uncertainty regarding how such 
companies, with the help of social media data and analytics, may (aim to) influence in-
dividuals’ decisions as voters. This also risks instilling abovementioned anxieties, by 
casting doubt on individuals’ perceived autonomy and freedom of choice when voting. 
While many have argued that the influence of CAL is highly doubtable (Martínez 2018; 
Wetherell, 2018; Trump 2018; see also Sutton 2018), this risk is also one of the reasons 
why (ongoing) investigations are urgently needed to safeguard public trust in the signif-
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icance of elections. Jourová’s description of the case as “wake-up call” referred mainly 
to the responsibility of politicians to ensure clarification and eventually needed coun-
ter-measures. Nevertheless, one may also ask what the controversy may mean to vot-
ers. A main concern here is that the debates around CAL run the risk of de-motivating 
and frustrating i.a. European voters − which appears particularly problematic on EU 
level, given the steady decrease in voter turnout in European elections (European Par-
liament 2014).  
In this section, I have argued that much uncertainty remains with regards to the 
2018 controversy concerning CAL/SCL, Facebook and GSR. This development risks fos-
tering anxiety of potential voters, with regards to their perceived autonomy and free-
dom of choice in elections. So far, I have mainly explored the role of CAL/SCL in this 
process. In the following section though, I will highlight another aspect of the scandal: 
the involvement of the initially mentioned scientist Aleksandr Kogan. I highlight his 
role, because it has been long argued that “[un]critical acceptance of datafication’s un-
derpinning ideological and commercial premises may well undermine the integrity of 
academic research in the long run” (van Dijck 2014, 206). Nevertheless, it still seems to 
take a scandal to bring such research up for discussion. Moreover, I look at the rele-
vance of news reporting that associated CAL’s approach with scientific, data-driven 
methods.  
 
 
3. The role of academic, big data-driven research 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, CAL/SCL received Facebook data from University 
of Cambridge (UoC) lecturer/researcher Aleksandr Kogan. In 2014, Kogan developed 
the Facebook personality-quiz app ‘This is your digital life’. With the help of this app, he 
retrieved data from Facebook users who installed the app and from their friends. 
Kogan’s work was directly inspired by a personality app previously developed and ex-
plored by some UoC colleagues (see also Vaidhyanathan 2018, chapter 6). The Face-
book personality quiz app ‘MyPersonality’ was developed by David Stillwell in 2007, 
while studying at University of Nottingham. Later, he started working as lecturer at 
UoC. In 2009, Michal Kosinski joined the project, as PhD student at UoC (see also Kosin-
ski n.d.) Both were part of UoC’s The Psychometrics Centre which is “[…] dedicated to 
research, teaching and product development in both pure and applied psychological 
assessment.” (The Psychometrics Centre n.d.) Psychometric research focuses largely on 
tools and theories for psychological measurements, i.e. testing and measuring (for ex-
ample) attitudes, personality traits or skills (see also Schoenherr and Hamstra 2016).   
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According to the app/research project website (Kosinski n.d.), 6 million people par-
ticipated in the app-based ‘MyPersonality’ questionnaires: users were able to decide 
whether they would like to donate their scores and data for research purposes, indicat-
ing their consent through an opt-in statement; about 40% agreed to this (see also 
Kosinski n.d.; Matz, Kosinski, Nave, and Stillwell 2017). In 2014, Stillwell and Kosinski 
were approached by Aleksandr Kogan, on behalf of SCL. Kogan inquired if the re-
searchers would provide SCL with the ‘MyPersonality Project’ database and model. The 
latter was partly based on the OCEAN scale for the ‘big five’ personality traits, i.e. 
openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, neuroticism 
(Vaidhyanathan 2018, chapter 6). However, the collaboration did eventually not 
emerge. The reasons for this are contested: Kogan stated that there was disagreement 
about the payment that Stillwell and Kosinski allegedly requested from SCL (Lewis, 
Grierson and Weaver 2018). Other sources however highlight that Stillwell and Kosinski 
had ethical concerns regarding SCL’s data practices and objectives (Grassegger and 
Krogerus 2017). 
Since Kogan was thus not able to receive the data and model from Stillwell and 
Kosinski, he and GSR co-founder Joseph Chancellor proceeded on their own. Through 
their ‘This is your digital live’ personality quiz app, they retrieved the needed data. 
While still working at UoC, these data were passed on to SCL through the newly found-
ed company GSR. Within their department, Kogan and Stillwell were confronted with 
and criticised for their approach, being i.a. accused of trying to realise a “‘get rich 
quick’ scheme” (Lewis, Grierson and Weaver 2018). Kogan insisted that he never re-
ceived a salary from SCL, but he did concede that SLC paid GSR £230,000 at some point 
(Lomas 2018). 
Already in September 2016, at the Concordia Summit, CAL CEO Nix talked about how 
the company had harnessed “the power of Big Data and psychographics in the electoral 
process” (Grassegger and Krogerus 2017). Nix claimed that by combining behavioural 
science, notably the Big Five/OCEAN Model, big data analytics and targeted political 
advertising messages CAL was able to steer election results. While he mentioned nei-
ther Kosinski and Stillwell’s nor Kogan and Chancellor’s work, parallels between the 
approaches were noted not only by Kosinski, but also by journalists (Grassegger and-
Krogerus 2017). In Grassegger and Krogerus’ widely circulated article “The Data That 
Turned the World Upside Down” (2017), Kosinski’s distances himself explicitly from the 
approaches taken by CAL and GSR. At the same time however, the article contributes 
to the idea that CAL’s strategies were modelled on scientific methods.5 
 
5
 The authors do raise the issue: “But to what extent did psychometric methods influence the outcome of 
the election? When asked, Cambridge Analytica was unwilling to provide any proof of the effectiveness of 
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This idea in turn lends credibility to the effectiveness of the approaches (as strategi-
cally promoted by companies such as CAL), despite this impact being questionable. In 
this sense, also Baldwin-Philippi (2017) argues: “[w]hile much has been written about 
the possibilities of data driven campaigning, the on-the-ground realities are often much 
less precise and much less novel than journalistic coverage implies” (627). The risk thus 
lies in transferring the credibility associated with scientific methods to ethically dubi-
ous, political data business practices. I thus argue that the discursive establishment of 
this myth, substantiated with reference to the use of scientific, data-driven methods, is 
one of the main reasons why it has been so difficult to relativize CAL’s effectiveness. As 
explained in the previous section, I have moreover argued that the uncertainties re-
garding CAL’s approaches are potentially damaging for individuals’ assessment of their 
own freedom of choice and autonomy as voters. In consequence, debunking the myth 
of CAL as rooted in scientific methods is a vital factor to address the significance of 
elections in a big data era.   
It is of course little surprising that Kosinski and others have asserted the effective-
ness of their methods and the value of psychometrics. This position is needed to up-
hold the relevance of their own, academic research. Yet, in contributing to news re-
porting that links this research to CAL’s business practices, they simultaneously lent 
credibility to the effectiveness of the company’s services. Still, as also Karpf (2017) 
points out, “[…] there is no evidence that Cambridge Analytica has solved the practical 
challenges of applying psychometrics to voter behaviour”. Thus, the researchers en-
tered complex, discursive interdependency linking the credibility of their own research 
to the purported effectiveness of CAL. What is therefore urgently needed are reports 
on CAL that separate its marketing and strategic communication, claimed to be 
grounded in scientific methods, from its actual practices. Needless to say though, so far 
it has been almost impossible to receive any reliable insights into the latter from those 
involved.   
Of all people entangled in the scandal, Kogan has notably questioned and down-
played the effectiveness of CAL’s strategies. In a BBC radio interview (cited in The 
Guardian), he stated:  
 
I personally don’t think micro-targeting is an effective way to use such data sets. It 
could have only hurt the campaign. What Cambridge Analytica has tried to sell is 
magic. And it made claims that this is incredibly accurate and it tells you everything 
 
its campaign. And it is quite possible that the question is impossible to answer.” (Grassegger and Krogerus 
2017) Yet, they proceed with a section on “clues” for the effectiveness. 
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there is to tell about you, but the reality is that it’s not that. If you really work 
through the statistics … those claims quickly fall apart. (Weaver 2018) 
 
Alas, such statements carry only little persuasive power, as they are easily dismissed 
as part of Kogan’s efforts in justifying his own role and the implications for democratic 
elections. They are closely related to how much responsibility he needs to assume for 
sharing the data with SCL. In consequence, such assurances are unlikely to make a con-
vincing case for the ineffectiveness of CAL’s approach.  
Data-driven research, located at leading universities, thus played a major role in 
fuelling uncertainty regarding CAL’s impact on recent elections. On the one hand, this 
is linked to the direct involvement of academics such as Kogan and Chancellor in col-
lecting data that were later commercially provided to SCL/CAL, via their company 
Global Science Research (GSR). On the other hand, this is related to news reporting that 
described CAL’s approaches as rooted in scientific methods. The emerging myth that 
CAL was relying on data-driven, scientifically inspired and thus allegedly effective 
methods is damaging and problematic insofar as it calls voters’ freedom of choice into 
question. It revives a debate that one can historically, recurrently witness with the 
emergence of new technologies: while e.g. mass media triggered discussions on mass 
persuasion and ‘manufactured consent’ (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; see also Thom-
son, 1977), social media have prompted concerns that individuals may receive ideolog-
ically infused messages, tailored to their personal fears, interests and preconceptions. 
This time round though not psychoanalysis, interviews and focus groups (see e.g. Pack-
ard 1957)6, but psychometrics and social media data are described as key to individu-
als’ decision making.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This commentary started from the observation that the controversy regarding 
CAL/SCL’s dubious data business practices instigated uncertainty among voters and 
politicians alike. CAL’s use of Facebook user data and its allegedly effective microtar-
geting of voters, to influence election results, called individuals’ autonomy and free-
dom of choice as voters into question. While the company’s data retrieval and market-
ing strategies are widely condemned as immoral, it is however debatable whether its 
methods were indeed also effective (Karpf 2017; Gonzalez 2017).  
 
6 
Despite having been a popular, influential book, it received “[…] widespread academic and advertising 
industry criticism, in part for its sensationalist, unsubstantiated writing […]” (Nelson 2008, 113). 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 11(2) 2018: 528-543, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v11i2p528 
  
538 
 
Ongoing debates around these issues speak to the relevance of big data for politics, 
on the one hand, and the politics of big data, on the other hand. Big data and related 
analytics have been promoted as part and parcel of effective, contemporary political 
campaigning. The scandal around CAL demonstrates however that such big data-driven 
strategies may clash with what is morally appropriate and, potentially, legal. While call-
ing attention to CAL’s immoral data collection methods, among other things, the scan-
dal also initiated discussions on if and how the company was able to influence individ-
uals’ voting behaviour.   
The latter point also hints at the politics of big data: the controversy around this 
question is related to the predominant idea of big data’s alleged superiority, notably in 
combination with their scientific use. Big data have been widely pitched and hyped as 
powerful backbone of scientific research − and this image was significant for CAL’s 
business claims as well as the uncertainty following the scandal. In addition to the sig-
nificance of widespread dataism (van Dijck 2014), the involvement of academics and 
news reporting on the inspirational role of big data-driven research further fuelled the 
Cambridge Analytica controversy. 
It has been proposed that CAL’s claims were little more than “snake oil” (see e.g. 
Sutton 2018), aimed at selling questionable services. Yet, its questionable claims were 
substantiated by the idea that the company’s approaches were modelled on scientific, 
big data-driven methods and relying on data collected by academics. This paper there-
fore examined how the involvement of academics in retrieving data and CAL’s purport-
edly scientifically inspired and grounded approach lent credibility to the effectiveness 
of its services. I argued that the uncertainty regarding whether CAL’s data business 
practices affected recent elections was linked to discourses in which the company as-
sociated itself with − and was associated with − scientific, big data-driven research.  
Ongoing investigations into the case as well as balanced news reporting are hence 
much needed to counter insecurity on side of voters and politicians alike. Countering 
the myth that CAL’s dubious strategies were built upon scientific, data-driven models 
and methods may help relativize emerging anxiety concerning voters’ (lack of) auton-
omy. Having said that, this perspective should not distract from CAL/SCL’s immoral in-
tentions and business practices – which may have moreover been illegal. At the same 
time, one may hope that the controversy also functions as a reminder of the im-
portance of vigilant, critical and media literate citizenship in the digital age. 
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